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THE ALCHEMY OF DISSENT
Jamal Greene*
Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America: A History (U. Chi.
Press 2008). Pp. 544. $55.00.
On July 10, 2010, the Orange/Sullivan County NY 912 Tea Party organized a
"Freedom from Tyranny" rally in the sleepy exurb of Middletown, New York. Via the
group's online Meetup page, anyone who was "sick of the madness in Washington" and
prepared to "[d]efend our freedom from Tyranny" was asked to gather on the grass next
to the local Perkins restaurant and Super 8 motel for the afternoon rally.1 Protesters were
encouraged to bring their lawn chairs for the picnic and fireworks to follow.
There was a time when I would have found an afternoon picnic a surprising
response to "Tyranny," but I have since come to expect it. The Tea Party movement that
has grown so exponentially in recent years is shrouded in irony. There is of course the
business of "keep your government hands off my Medicare" and, more generally, the
apparently unselfconscious effort to build a coherent community of radical individualists,
what intellectual historian Mark Lilla recently called "the politics of the libertarian
mob."2 But what interests me here is the sense of victimization the movement's
adherents seem to experience. Tea Party supporters tend overwhelmingly to be white, are
disproportionately male, and are wealthier and better educated, on average, than the
general population. 3 American tyranny has had its victims over the years, and these are
not they. One could be forgiven the impression that the movement rather invents
suppression, or at least seeks it out, that it may dissent.
I thought often of the Tea Party as I read Stephen Feldman's ambitious Free
Expression and Democracy in America.4 For one, the peculiar symbiosis between
suppression and dissent is Feldman's principal subject, and it pervades part of his thesis
that the American commitment to free expression at any given time is a vector forged
both of legal doctrine and of the interplay between powerful and competing traditions of
suppression and dissent. "Dissent," he writes, "begets suppression, which begets
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School
1. Randy & Sheryl Thomas, Orange/Sullivan Cnty NY 912 Tea Party, Stop the Madness! Freedom from
Tyranny Rally, http://www.meetup.com/OrangeSullivanCounty-NY-912/calendar/13504512/ (last accessed
Nov. 6, 2010).
2. Mark Lilla, The Tea Party Jacobins, 57 N.Y. Rev. Bks. 53, 53 (May 27, 2010).
3. Kate Zernike & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Discontent's Demography: Who Backs the Tea Party, 159
N.Y. Times Al (Apr. 15, 2010).
4. Stephen M. Feldman, Free Expression and Democracy in America: A History (U. Chi. Press 2008).
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dissent." Justice Robert Jackson would have been at least as true to history had he called
suppression of dissent rather than freedom from compelled speech - the "fixed star in
our constitutional constellation." 6 Like any good foils, suppression and dissent need each
other to acquire substance and heft. Dissent has become a constitutional norm, not
because it is implicit in the text of the First Amendment but because it has risen from a
long, striated history of political struggle that suppression has ignited.
Feldman writes within the tradition that academic lawyers identify with popular
constitutionalism, and that political scientists sometimes call the political construction of
judicial review. These are distinct ideas, but they hold in common the conceit that
judicial adjudication of constitutional rights is no less the product of political contest
than are legislative enactments or electoral victories.7 Their common target is the nafve
view that traditional legal materials text, original understanding, structure, and
precedent are sufficient to understand constitutional outcomes. For Feldman, the
alternating victors in the pitched battle between traditions of suppression and dissent
have reflected changes in democratic politics mediated through judicial decisions. We
have turned away, he says, from the "republican" notion that free expression may be
restricted in the name of the common good, and towards the "pluralist" conception of
free expression as necessary for, alternatively, collective self-government, the search for
truth, or self-expression. That transformation has been born of cultural, technological,
and demographic change, and from a concomitant history of ideas that themselves have
required suppression to find persuasive articulation.
A book is not enough to tell this tale, even at close to 500 pages of text, and
Feldman struggles to find focus through 300 years of political and intellectual history,
not all of it obviously related to free expression. I am neither willing nor able to canvass
that history in this space, but one example should give a sense of the tome's tone. The
First World War was a low moment for freedom of expression in the United States. The
Espionage Act of 1917,9 as amended by the Sedition Act of 1918,10 authorized criminal
prosecution and lengthy prison terms for, among other offenses, speaking, writing, or
advocating "any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about the form of
government of the United States, or the Constitution . . . or the military or naval forces of
the United States or the flag." 1l More than 2,000 people were prosecuted under the Act,
more than 1,000 convictions were obtained, and twenty-four people received prison
sentences of twenty years or longer.12 Eugene V. Debs, the Socialist Party leader and
serial presidential candidate, received a ten-year prison sentence for advocating,
indirectly if at all, that laborers avoid the draft. 13 Debs was a casualty of the Red Scare,
which generally postdated hostilities but nonetheless found consistent favor with the
5. Id. at 152.
6. W Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
7, See Mark A. Graber, Constructing Judicial Review, 8 Annual Rev. Political Sci. 425, 428 (2005).
8. Feldman, supra n. 4, at 4-5.
9. Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (repealed 1921).
10. Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (repealed 1921).
11. Id. at 553.
12. Feldman, supra n. 4, at 251.
13. Id. at 262; see also Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
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Supreme Court, which upheld numerous seditious-libel prosecutions during the 1918
term and beyond.14
And yet, the Red Scare is responsible for two of the most significant developments
in the history of American dissent. First, it prompted the great civil-liberties scholar
Zechariah Chafee, Jr. to publish "Freedom of Speech in War Time"'
5 in the Harvard
Law Review. Chafee argued, quoting Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's brief unanimous
opinion in Schenck v. U.S., 16 that free speech, even during war, should be limited only
when the words "are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent."1 7 Chafee substantially agreed with Holmes's language, but Holmes
did not at the time view the test as any more rigorous than the traditional inquiry into
whether the speech at issue had "bad tendencies." 18 The outcome in Schenck, which
upheld a prosecution for circulating leaflets advocating repeal of the selective service
law, is illustrative.
The Chafee article appears to have helped change Holmes's mind. Holmes read the
article and even discussed it with Chafee over tea in the summer following the Schenck
decision. 19 The next term, Holmes dissented in Abrams v. U.S.,20 which upheld an
Espionage Act prosecution based on a newly robust clear and present danger test.21
Holmes was able to refashion himself as a free-speech champion in later cases,22 and a
version of the clear and present danger test as articulated by Chafee in his article and by
Holmes in Abrams has since become the governing standard for the constitutional
protection of criminal advocacy. 23
A second important product of the Red Scare was the American Civil Liberties
Union ("ACLU"), the single most influential organization in the subsequent history of
American free speech. Founder Roger Baldwin had been imprisoned during the war for
refusing induction and was responsible for the creation of the National Civil Liberties
Bureau ("NCLB"), which advocated on behalf of conscientious objectors.24 Motivated
by the government suppression typified by the anti-Communist raids engineered by
Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, the NCLB morphed into the ACLU after the
14. See Schaefer v. U.S., 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Debs, 249 U.S. 211;
Frohwerk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Sugarman v. U.S., 249 U.S. 182 (1919); Schenck v. US., 249 U.S. 47
(1919); see generally Feldman, supra n. 4, at 263-266.
15. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom ofSpeech in War Time, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 932 (1919).
16. 249 U.S. 47.
17. Chafee, supra n. 15, at 967 (quoting Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52).
18. Feldman, supra n. 4, at 264. The "bad tendency" test was first articulated in Patterson v. Colo., 205
U.S. 454 (1907).
19. Feldman, supra n. 4, at 273.
20. 250 U.S. 616.
21. Id. at 624 (Holmes, J., dissenting); see Feldman, supra n. 4, at 274-277.
22. See e.g. Schaefer, 251 U.S. at 482 (Brandeis & Holmes, JJ., dissenting); Gitlow v. NY, 268 U.S. 652,
672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
23. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[T]he constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action.").
24. See Feldman, supra n. 4, at 257.
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war.25 The ACLU was and remains able to foster broad support by dedicating itself to
the protection of political expression as such, whether by or against mainstream interests.
Writes Feldman, "only after World War I and the ensuing Red Scare could one truly
refer to a civil liberties 'movement."' 26
Feldman tells a similar story of action and reaction about a number of other
speech-related episodes in American political history. Abolitionist mailings from
Northern agitators led to private violence and to antimailing laws in the South. 27 The
excesses of the McCarthy era led the Supreme Court to rule against the government in
twelve out of twelve Communism-related cases in the 1956 term, which in turn prompted
frenzied efforts to strip the Court of jurisdiction over subversive-activities
investigations.28 The aggressive and sometimes violent protests of the Vietnam War and
civil rights era led to violent suppression at the 1968 Democratic Convention and were
perhaps an impetus for President Richard Nixon's notorious Enemies List, but also
created a climate in which the Supreme Court could issue speech-protective decisions in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,29 Cohen v. California,30 and the Pentagon Papers
case. 31 These episodes are not elaborations upon or tests of the First Amendment but
rather are the First Amendment, each a dot in a pointillist mosaic that constitutes our
higher law.
As important, the balance between suppression and dissent is a dynamic
equilibrium, shifting over time as history informs our ideal conceptions of free
expression and democracy. Feldman identifies the transition from republican to pluralist
democracy in particular with the demographic transition wrought by immigration and the
economic, technological, and cultural changes that introduced mass consumerism into
the American ethos. The legal realism movement, and the positivist tradition of which it
was part, questioned the idea that law was or could be responsive to an essential common
good. If a just and democratic society could be measured at all, it would be measured in
terms of procedural fairness; a good government was one that permitted all competing
conceptions of the good to be expressed. 32
The jurisprudential split between substantive and procedural conceptions of
democratic right is most evident in the series of New Deal-era cases that led to Justice
Owen Roberts's famous switch in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,3 3 upholding
Washington's minimum-wage law for women, and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 34 upholding the National Labor Relations Act as applied to steel manufacturing.
In Adkins v. Children's Hospital,35 which West Coast Hotel expressly overruled, Justice
George Sutherland had complained that the minimum-wage law in that case did not
25, Id. at 285-288.
26, Id at 290.
27. Id. at 123-133.
28. Id. at 447-449.
29. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30, Cohen v. Cal., 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
31. N. Y Times Co. v. US., 403 U.S. 713 (1971); see generally Feldman, supra n. 4, at 452-460.
32. See Feldman, supra n. 4, at 396.
33. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
34. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
35. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
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comport with the common good because it "takes account of the necessities of only one
party to the contract."36 This suspicion of interest-group legislation is nowhere to be
found in West Coast Hotel. Quite to the contrary, Chief Justice Charles Hughes noted
that the minimum wage at issue was "fixed after full consideration by representatives of
employers, employees and the public;"37 as such, any substantive imbalance between
employees and employers was a matter of legislative prerogative. 38
The substance-procedure dichotomy, and its overlay atop republican versus
pluralist theories of democracy, is a less obvious frame for First Amendment cases, and
Feldman does a service in suggesting it. The idea here is that the shift to pluralist
democracy invites a presumption in favor of protecting the formation of opinions, most
especially political ones, and away from permitting those opinions to be suppressed in
deference to an exogenously determined common good. One might arrive at that idea
either by assuming political opinions to be the very stuff of self-governance; or by
believing that expression of opinions will enhance the search for the true information
upon which we base our civic decision making; or by believing that individual autonomy
is enhanced by lifting restrictions on self-expression. Feldman's claim is that resort to
these sorts of theories became more prevalent and successful in court as our democracy
became more evidently pluralist rather than republican.
Linking free expression to the dichotomy between pluralist and republican
democracy is not new, but Feldman has done more work than anyone to join that
dichotomy to a generally persuasive intellectual and jurisprudential history of the First
Amendment. It is in any event too high a bar to require that books state new ideas,
especially about matters as overtheorized as free expression and democracy. To merit our
praise it is enough that a book says something correct - or at least provocative - and says
it well. If enough writers do that, new generations may discover old ideas, and that is
hardly a bad thing.
Note, too, that in merely identifying the robust free expression protected by the
First Amendment as historically constructed, Feldman breaks ranks with the Tea Party.
Tea Partiers frequently claim to be constitutional originalists. According to the website
of the Tea Party Patriots, one of the largest Tea Party affiliated groups, among the
foundational principles of the movement is that "it is possible to know the original intent
of the government our founders set forth," and Tea Party Patriots "stand in support of
that intent." 39 Feldman's book helps us to understand what this view, taken seriously,
means in the realm of free expression. A return to the original intent behind the First
Amendment may not be such a happy reunion for Tea Partiers. According to an April
2010 CBS News/New York Times poll, fifty-nine percent of Tea Party supporters either
affirmatively believe President Barack Obama was born in another country or are not
persuaded that he was born in the United States. 40 There is loose (though not unanimous)
36. Id. at 557.
37. W. Coast Hotel Co., 300 U.S. at 396.
38. Id. at 399-400.
39. Tea Party Patriots, Mission Statement and Core Values, http://www.teapartypatriots.org/Mission.aspx
(last accessed Nov. 4, 2010).
40. Stephanie Condon, Poll: "Birther" Myth Persists Among Tea Partiers, All Americans,
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544162-20002539-503544.html?tag-contentMain;contentBody (posted
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agreement among constitutional historians, Feldman included, that as originally
understood the First Amendment would not have prevented someone publicly calling the
president a fraud from being prosecuted for seditious libel.
The widely held view of many leading citizens at the time of the founding was that
the First Amendment protected against prior restraints but prevented neither criminal
punishment nor civil liability for seditious statements that called public figures into
disrepute or threatened to disturb public order. The 1798 Sedition Act 41 held criminal the
writing, printing, uttering, or publishing of "any false, scandalous, and malicious writing
or writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress
of the United States, or the President of the United States." 42 Famously, the legislatures
of Virginia and Kentucky issued resolutions, 43 written respectively by James Madison
and Thomas Jefferson, opposing the Act as unconstitutional. But the crux of the states'
objection was not that seditious libel could never be proscribed, but rather that Congress
was not constitutionally empowered to enact laws related to speech. As the third
Kentucky Resolution stated, "all lawful powers respecting [speech] did of right remain,
and were reserved, to the states or the people: . . . thus was manifested their
determination to retain to themselves the right of judging how far the licentiousness of
speech and of the press may be abridged without lessening their useful freedom." 44 The
argument, then, was grounded not in civil liberties but in federalism, and indeed
Jefferson endorsed state prosecutions for seditious libel once he became president.45 A
minority report to the Virginia Resolutions, likely authored by future Chief Justice John
Marshall, gave the traditional common law definition of freedom of the press: "a liberty
to publish, free from previous restraint, any thing and every thing at the discretion of the
printer only, but not the liberty of spreading with impunity false and scandalous slanders
which may destroy the peace and mangle the reputation of an individual or of a
community."46 Talk of death panels would have been meet for suppression.
Of course, we have since come to understand contemptuous political statements as
archetypal protected speech, but it is an embarrassment for originalists generally
unacknowledged that their theory does not agree. As Feldman and others have shown,
the Sedition Act controversy is responsible for early articulations of a more libertarian
First Amendment, 47 and over the last several decades the libertarian reading has been
dominant both within the literature and on the Court, but that reading is strained as a
matter of original understanding. The absolute best one could offer is that the
constitutionality of seditious-libel prosecutions at the founding was perfectly
Apr. 14, 2010, 6:30 p.m. EDT).
41. Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).
42. Id. at § 2.
43, Kentucky Resolutions (Dec. 3, 1799) (available at http://avalon.1aw.yale.edu/18thcentury/kenres.asp);
Virginia Resolutions (Dec. 24, 1798) (available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th century/virres.asp).
44, Thomas Jefferson, Drafts of the Kentucky Resolutions of 1798, in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson vol.
7, 189, 194 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1896).
45. See Thomas Jefferson, Speech, Second Inaugural Address (D.C., Mar. 4, 1805), in Thomas Jefferson:
Writings 518-522 (Lib. Am. 1984); see also Feldman, supra n. 4, 109-110.
46. Feldman, supra n. 4, at 86 (quoting Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 22, 1799));
see also Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Bill of Rights 111-121 (Yale U. Press 1999).
47. See Feldman, supra n. 4, at 80, 90.
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ambiguous. 48 The freedom to dissent through angry and incautious language, so essential
to the Tea Party's vitality, was not protected by the framers' Constitution. This may be
the Tea Party's ultimate irony.
An additional layer of irony invites discussion of what I regard as Feldman's most
controversial set of claims. The Tea Party explicitly rejects the notion that constitutional
norms evolve, even as that evolution enables the movement itself. But aspects of Tea
Party rhetoric also appear to reject pluralism itself, the engine of that evolution. That is
so even bracketing the birther movement, with its outsized attention to the President's
origins. The frequent charges of racism leveled at the Tea Party movement are only
circumstantially substantiated, but when, following the election of the country's first
black president, an almost all-white movement angrily vows to "take our country back"
and openly harkens to an age marked by chattel slavery, the question of race is
unavoidable. 49
Even beyond the particular provenance of Tea Party anger, however, the question
of race is unavoidable in discussions of originalism itself. The "dead hand" argument is a
frequent criticism of originalism. The basic charge usually objects to reliance on original
understanding on the ground that those who drafted and ratified the Constitution cannot
adequately represent the living, in part because they lived in a society that was formally,
and radically, unequal. This argument is somewhat misplaced as I have stated it: the
problem is not that the framers did not represent us then in a demographic sense; the
dead hand problem would persist even if the demographics of the electorate and of civil
society perfectly mirrored that of the present age. The problem, rather, is that originalist
argument fails to represent us today. I have written elsewhere that originalism is most
persuasive insofar as it enables us to imaginatively represent the normative commitments
of today as keeping faith with the framers.50 For many Americans, the framers embody
the political ideals that define Americanness, and the rhetorical purchase of originalist
argument extends as far as the appeal of their age as sadly lost. For other Americans,
however, the framers also embody ideals of unspeakable and irreconcilable cruelty, and
the failure of originalist argument extends as far as the lament of their age as sadly
unrealized. The authority of the founding era does not equally resonate for all
Americans, and originalism's principal appeal lies in its resonance. 51
Feldman offers delicious fodder for the view that the framers do not deserve
unqualified admiration. Usually when claims of that sort are made, proponents offer
evidence that the framers did not live up to the expectations that their ideals suggest. But
it is possible to read Feldman as suggesting that those ideals were themselves defective.
A corollary to Feldman's argument that we have shifted gradually from a republican to a
pluralist democracy is that republican democracy encourages the exclusion of outsiders.
"During the framing era, Americans constructed republican democratic governments
48. See Levy, supra n. 46, at 118.
49. For discussion of efforts to demonstrate empirically that Tea Party supporters harbor "racial
resentment," see e.g. Arian Campo-Flores, Are Tea Partiers Racist?, http://www.newsweek.com/-
2010/04/25/are-tea-partiers-racist.html (Apr. 26, 2010).
50. See Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 8-9 (2009).
51. Id. at 75 n. 524.
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grounded on the assumed existence of a common good for a homogenous people,"52
Feldman writes. "But how did these Americans maintain homogeneity? By excluding
other Americans from belonging to and participating in the polity." 53 There are at least
three distinct ways of understanding this claim, and they mirror the three principal ways
in which we understand discrimination more generally. Feldman could be arguing that
the republican conception of democracy was selected precisely because it lends itself to,
and indeed acts as a pretext for, exclusion; that it was selected with full knowledge of its
exclusive capacity, but with no specific intention to exclude; or that it was selected
notwithstanding its unfortunate tendency to exclude. Feldman does not make clear which
he means.
The usefulness of revolutionary-era rhetoric to serve the nefarious ends of the
framers was once more frequently advanced in mainstream legal and historical
scholarship. Charles Beard's landmark An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of
the United States54 argued that economic self-interest rather than republican spirit
motivated the men who attended the Constitutional Convention. But Beard's "because of
not in spite of' claim has fallen deeply out of favor since the middle of the last century,
in part based on the work of scholars like Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood, and Akhil
Amar. Bailyn's Pulitzer Prize winning The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution5 5 offered what many regard as a decisive rebuttal to Beard's skepticism about
the framers' true motives, but, significantly, in his discussion of slavery he suggests that
revolutionary ideas helped doom the institution.56 Wood likewise has argued that "the
Revolution suddenly and effectively ended the cultural climate that had allowed black
slavery, as well as other forms of bondage and unfreedom, to exist throughout the
colonial period without serious challenge." 57 Contrast these views with those of
Feldman, who writes that "republican democracy facilitated long-term exclusion" of
African Americans and Native Americans from political power.58
It is difficult to know quite what to make of this claim. Feldman is frustratingly
imprecise in his discussions of race and exclusion, and he leaves more on the table than
the subject deserves. He may be arguing that, inasmuch as republican democracy
requires virtuous citizens in order to be successful, it invites or perhaps even requires
discrimination against those perceived to be lacking in virtue. 59 His reference to the
"republican democratic propensity toward exclusion" 60 certainly suggests such a
reading. But if this is what he means, he has dropped a stealth atom bomb. In more
sympathetic hands, the republican democratic tradition rather empowers minorities and
otherwise marginalized speakers. For Owen Fiss, a more republican conception of
democracy can help us better understand the great costs of allowing uninhibited
52. Feldman, supra n. 4, at 5.
53. Id
54. Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States (Macmillan Co.
1913).
55. Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Belknap Press 1967).
56. Id. at 246.
57. Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 186 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1991).
58. Feldman, supra n. 4, at 105.
59. See id. at 170-171.
60. Id at 211 (emphasis added).
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corporate speech in a capitalist age.61 Cass Sunstein emphasizes the contemporary
republican democratic obsession with equality of political power, robust participation,
and inculcation of (republican rather than political) citizenship. 62
Feldman may instead espouse the more traditional view that republican democracy
does not inherently support exclusion but that it has been used pretextually to do so. He
writes that "[t]he social homogeneity that had [during the revolutionary era] grounded
the republican democratic common good" 63 was "always in part a pretense," 64 but there
is no elaboration on what is meant by that. Likewise, drawing implicitly on the work of
Derrick Bell, Feldman drifts in and out of discussion of a kind of "interest
convergence" 65 between elite interests and the beneficiaries of many of the Court's First
Amendment cases, but does not subject the claim to serious analytic rigor. Feldman says
that "[t]he fact that only a small minority of Americans voted for the delegates to the
state ratification conventions for the proposed Constitution was neither surprising nor
accidental."66 By this he means that approval of the Constitution was generally limited to
white, male, property owners in order to preserve republican virtue, but what does
Feldman make of the fact that, as Amar has noted, the election of delegates to the
constitutional ratifying conventions was the most participatory process the world had
ever known, with eight states relaxing their ordinary property requirements for
legislative voting?67
Feldman argues that elites pursued a "strategy" 68 of supporting the Court after the
1937 switch in time because they "recognized that the judicial enforcement of
constitutional rights could provide a potential bulwark against the majoritarian threat
posed by the (pluralist) democratic empowerment of peripheral groups," 69 and he later
states that, after 1937, "the Court rarely resolved free-expression issues contrary to elite
or mainstream views." 70 These are remarkable statements, too remarkable for the limited
support Feldman provides. To back the first claim, Feldman cites to two bar-association
addresses,71 neither of which even tangentially suggests elite preoccupation with a
majoritarian threat by out groups, and to Professor Ran Hirschl's article elaborating a
similar theory of the impetus behind rights-protecting judicial review in Israel, Canada,
New Zealand, and South Africa! 72
The second statement is in the nature of an empirical claim and relies, for example,
61. See Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1405 (1986).
62. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539 (1988).
63. Feldman, supra n. 4, at 180-181.
64. Id. at 181.
65. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L.
Rev. 518 (1980).
66. Feldman, supra n. 4, at 24.
67. See Akhil Reed Amar, America's Constitution: A Biography 7 (Random House 2005).
68. Feldman, supra n. 4, at 366.
69. Id.
70. Id at 409.
71. See Richard W. Steele, Free Speech in the Good War 11 (St. Martin's Press 1999) (quoting a 1938
speech by ABA president-elect Frank Hogan); Grenville Clark, Conservatism and Civil Liberty, 24 ABA J. 640
(1938).
72. Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins ofJudicial Empowerment through Constitutionalization: Lessons of
Four Constitutional Revolutions, 25 L. & Soc. Inquiry 91, 95-103 (2000).
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on the Court's many cases protecting Jehovah's Witnesses, who were virulently anti-
Catholic. 73 It is a leap of some distance, though, from harboring anti-Catholic feelings to
possessing an "interest" in having handbills thrust in one's face on one's doorstep74 or
anti-Catholic slurs piped through loudspeakers in one's neighborhood. 75 And what of
Taylor v. Mississippi, 76 decided the same day as Barnette,77 which reversed the World
War II sedition convictions of three Jehovah's Witnesses who had been accused of
sowing disloyalty by encouraging resistance to compelled flag salutes? 78  Or
Beauharnais v. Illinois,79 unmentioned entirely by Feldman, in which the Court upheld
Illinois's group libel prohibition against a man who had distributed literature urging
Chicago officials to "halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of white
people, their property, neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro?"8 0 One could argue,
perhaps, that the Beauharnais Court was simply protecting elite interests in favor of civil
rights, but then what of Feiner v. New York,81 argued one term earlier, in which the
Court upheld civil-rights activist Irving Feiner's prosecution for incitement based on a
heckler's veto theory? Did elite interests shift, or was the Court in both cases protecting
an interest in avoiding violent racial confrontation? We never learn. I do not deny the
quasi-tautological claim that, across a range of doctrinal areas, elites rarely support
jurisprudence or political projects that conflict with their material or aesthetic self-
interest. But this seems rather less common in the First Amendment context than in many
others.
These challenges would have been better left unprompted than unanswered or, for
that matter, answered too casually. Feldman's asides about ethnic exclusion and interest
convergence confound more than they enlighten. I will admit, though, that the effort is
understandable. It would feel incomplete in a study of this sort to ignore the politics of
exclusion, in effect to offer a theory of democracy without a theory of distrust. So many
of the historical flashpoints of suppression and dissent revolve around hyperbolic
suspicion of outsiders. I find particularly illuminating Feldman's discussion of the
Populists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.82 They were largely
evangelical Protestants and harbored deep skepticism about urbanization, immigration,
and the corrupt politics of Washington. They believed the "'plain people' of 'the
Republic"'83 needed a third party free from the captured Democrats and Republicans,
and they harkened back to the party-free republican politics of the founding:
[T]he Populists' agenda revolved around a "bad apple" conception of republican politics.
The people, for the most part, were hardworking, imbued with common sense, and
73. See Feldman, supra n. 4, at 410; see e.g. Murdock v. Pa., 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Conn., 310
U.S. 296 (1940).
74. See e.g. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Schneider v. N.J., 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
75. See Saia v. N. Y., 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
76. Taylor v. Miss., 319 U.S. 583 (1943).
77. 319 U.S. 624.
78. Taylor, 319 U.S. at 590.
79. Beauharnais v. Ill., 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
80. Id at 252.
81. Feiner v. N. Y, 340 U.S 315 (1951).
82. Feldman, supra n. 4, at 187-190.
83. Id. at 188.
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grounded on solid Protestant values; in a word, the people were virtuous. Thus, they just
needed to dump the bad apples who had seized control of the government - to throw the
rascals out of ofice - and to elect instead men like Jefferson and Jackson.84
They began, Feldman says, "to view themselves as 'victims.'
85
This should sound familiar. For all its self-contradiction - that is, despite itself - the
Tea Party movement manages to be distinctly American. As Jack Balkin has argued,
Americans across many generations have framed their normative agendas through
rhetoric, alternately, of redemption or restoration.86 Feldman tells us a great deal about
the origins of free expression that movements like the Tea Party seek to connect to their
own ends, but also helps us understand the origins of the Tea Party itself. It is enabled
precisely by a tradition of dynamic constitutional development, despite its attraction to
originalism. Like many Americans before them, Tea Partiers have constructed history in
their own image, eliding it with an ethical commitment to dissent that has itself evolved
through a mixture of doctrine, culture, and politics. The movement's challenge is to
identify something to dissentfrom that also resonates with our traditions. For as Feldman
reminds us, without suppression, efforts at dissent fall as flat as a picnic blanket on a lazy
summer's day.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 187.
86. See Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 549, 609-
611 (2010).
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